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ABStrAct
Since drugs became both a public and social issue in Nigeria, fear about both the real and 
imagined catastrophic effects of sale and use has led to a reliance on extreme measures 
to control supply and discourage demand. The traditional ‘prohibitive’ attitude has been 
the preferred option in a sustained ‘drug war’. This analysis draws from extant research 
literature, published documents and media reports on drug policy matters. Although 
the age-long war on drug policy in Nigeria may be producing some desired results, there 
is evidence of negative consequences and unresolved issues associated with the war. 
These issues include economic, crime, human rights, development and security, public 
health, discrimination and environment. The paper calls for a shift from the over-reliance 
on law enforcement to harm reduction and treatment for people addicted to drugs. The 
shift will provide far more cost-effective drug control results and guarantee the rights 
of Nigerians as enshrined in the U. N. Human Rights Declaration and the constitution of 
Nigeria. 
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introDuction
The war on drugs and its operational 
strategies have continued to come under 
the spotlight with increasing scrutiny by 
many writers (see Nadelmann, 1998; Chil-
ton, 2001; Reuter, 1997; Caulkins, Reuter, 
Iguchi & Chiesa, 2005; Obot, 2004; Gray, 
2009; Crook, 2009; Otu, 2011). These au-
thors have critically assessed the current 
prohibition and incarceration policies on 
drugs, and have drawn attention to their 
damaging effects or outright failure. For 
instance, Chilton (2001) reviewed the war 
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on drugs in the U.S. and explained that 
“it is a tragic and misguided one which 
remains the foolhardy effort of our time” 
(p. 1). Crook (2009) referred to the cur-
rent wave of war on drugs as a ‘brainless’ 
policy and explained that U.S’s implacable 
and unrepentant blend of prohibition and 
punitive criminal justice is wrong-headed 
in every way: immoral in principle, since it 
prosecutes victimless crimes, and in prac-
tice a complete disaster of remarkable 
proportions.
A review of the literature shows that 
interest in drug matters and particularly 
drug policy in Nigeria has a long history 
(see Odejide, 1989; Ebie and Pela, 1981; 
Pela and Ebie, 1982; Obot, 2001, 2006; 
Asuni, 1964, Lambo, 1965; Otu, 1995). It 
predates 1960 when the country gained 
her independence from the United King-
dom. For instance, Oloruntoba (2006) 
noted that by 1935, the first Drug Control 
Law in Nigeria termed the ‘Dangerous 
Drugs Ordinance’ of 1935 was enacted. 
This Ordinance regulated (and not prohib-
ited) the importation, exportation, manu-
facture, sales, and use of opium and other 
dangerous drugs. By 1960, drugs (includ-
ing alcohol), had become a major public 
issue in Nigeria as evidenced by a large 
increase in drug seizures, arrests, and 
prosecutions for prohibited drugs nota-
bly cannabis (Asuni, 1964, Lambo, 1965; 
Obot, 2004). The need to curtail sale and 
use was also a major concern. From this 
period onward, domestic legislations 
which focused on the control and prohibi-
tion of drugs, especially hemp (Cannabis 
Sativa), became entrenched. Oloruntoba 
(2006) explained that the vigour and sus-
tained efforts to legislate against drugs 
in contemporary Nigeria was because of 
the growing notoriety of the country as 
a transit point or centre for recruitment 
of drug couriers, and a growing pattern 
of consumption of these drugs within the 
country. By the 1980s, it became clear 
that more Nigerians were getting involved 
in the distribution of drugs, both within 
the country and beyond, while citizens 
also experimented with, and used these 
drugs. The same period marked the be-
ginning of a truly sustained war on drugs 
and/or war on the people as evidenced in 
the creation of a separate agency known 
as the Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency (NDLEA) to wage this war to its 
logical conclusion. 
Nigeria’s increasing notoriety in the 
international illegal drug economy in the 
1980s did not help matters at all. If noth-
ing else, it impelled the Nigerian authori-
ties to intensify her war policy on the traf-
fickers and users alike. Though regulations 
continued to oscillate between stiff and 
mild outlooks, perhaps in response to the 
prevailing circumstances (see Obot, 2004; 
Oloruntoba, 2006), the bulk of these reg-
ulations have continued to lay emphasis 
on prohibition and punishment (see Drug 
War Chronicle, 1/18/08). This is aptly 
demonstrated by the extent of a total war 
being waged against all non-medical use, 
manufacture and sale of drugs, with less 
attention being paid to the alternatives 
of demand and harm reduction. This ap-
proach is a continuation from the colo-
nial period, with prevailing overtones of 
drugs as being morally reprehensible, and 
therefore, not tolerated in the society. 
In an analysis of Nigeria’s drug poli-
cies, Obot (2004) explained that the war 
on drugs in Nigeria during the military 
era was based on the perceived need 
to achieve the US certification bench-
marks which consequently led to failure 
to evolve a-home-grown solution to the 
problems of drug. In fact, as his argument 
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implied, the war on drugs resulted in sig-
nificant economic, social and psychologi-
cal consequences for Nigeria and Nigeri-
ans (see Obot, 2004). So even when it is 
became obvious that the war was failing 
to achieve its aim of getting these drugs 
out of the Nigerian society, the Nigerian 
authority, like her counterparts, showed a 
disinterest in looking at the other side of 
handling the drug problems. 
This paper draws from the basic argu-
ments of the extant analyses, and takes 
a step in the direction of the analysis by 
Obot (2004) and similar others. However, 
the paper also notes that there is a gap 
with regards to the full impacts of this 
war on the Nigerian people. Therefore, in 
this paper, a harder approach is taken to 
engage with some of the important fall-
outs of this war which have been raised 
and analysed in different isolated man-
ners though not sufficiently critical in call-
ing for radical policy departure. Thus, the 
present paper asks the questions: What 
are the latent and manifest negative im-
pacts of the war on drugs in Nigeria? Cui 
bono (who benefits in the whole war on 
drugs)? What alternative drug policy op-
tion is available to Nigeria?
The style of the present paper is both 
critical and anatytic. It is premised on a 
cultural perspective which sees the war 
policy as no more than a product of moral 
panic that is borne out of what Reinarman 
(1994) referred to as ‘drug scares’. Reinar-
man avers that moral panic generally, and 
the specific drug scares, are part and par-
cel of human nature (culture) which have 
become recurring cultural, political and 
economic phenomena in their own right so 
that the resultant rightist drug policy—anti-
drug crusades, punitiveness, war and other 
marked nuanced public concern about 
drugs—can be explained sociologically. 
In sum, the paper argues that the cur-
rent war on drugs in Nigeria is causing a 
nightmare to Nigerians as it is consum-
ing Nigerians in great numbers. It draws 
on data from the National Drug Law En-
forcement Agency (NDLEA), published 
documents, relevant periodical literature, 
research and media reports to examine 
the nature, extent, modus operandi and a 
whole lot of complex issues and implica-
tions of the current drug policy. 
the Drug SituAtion in nigeriA
Two decades ago, NDLEA (1992) had 
noted that illicit sale and use of sub-
stances was on the rise among Nigerian 
urban youths. Using Lagos and Kano as a 
case study, the agency noted that young 
Nigerians in the nation’s urban secondary 
schools were already familiar with, and 
were using substances such as alcoholic 
beverages, cigarettes, cannabis, amphet-
amines, a little of heroin, cocaine and 
other stimulants and depressants. 
Gyong and Tanimu (2010) in their study 
found that there was a steady increase in 
the number of suspects arrested for drug 
related offences in Nigeria over the past 
two decades. For instance, they revealed 
that the number of suspects arrested 
rose from 293 persons in 1991, to a maxi-
mum of 6,323 persons in 2006, showing 
an increase of 2,158%. Their study also 
showed an increase in female involve-
ment in drug related offences with an in-
crease from 61 females in 1994 to 440 in 
2006. Citing Iyamabo (1990), Obot (2004) 
observed that between 1979 and 1988, a 
total of 14,833 arrests and 4,574 convic-
tions for drug related offences especially 
in trafficking, involving Nigerians, were 
recorded in foreign countries alone.
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In the first three months of the year 
2009, the NDLEA arrested a total of 38 
persons at the Murtala Mohammed Inter-
national Airport Lagos alone. The agen-
cy’s also disclosed that it arrested a total 
of 6,308 suspects in 2007 and 7,899 in 
year 2008, showing an increase of 1,591 
cases representing 20.14 per cent. 
The U.S. State Department’s 2007 In-
ternational Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report reported that sale and local con-
sumption of marijuana in Nigeria was on 
the increase. It linked the rise in the do-
mestic use of marijuana in Nigeria to the 
increased quantities seized, the number 
and size of illicit plots discovered and 
destroyed, and numbers of arrests made 
by the NDLEA. Below is a table showing 
the drug situation in Nigeria between the 
periods 1990-2008.
Analysis of the table shows that with 
the exception of a few years, there was 
a consistent upsurge in the quantity of 
drugs reportedly being interdicted by the 
NDLEA between 1990-2011. For instance, 
from 1994, it is clear that the figure shift-
ed from that of single digit to double dig-
its, and continued in an upward direction 
with three digits. The same trend is ob-
served with the number of persons inter-
dicted for various drug dealing offences. 
These figures may have been the product 
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table 1. The distribution of drug seizures and arrestees between 1990 – 2011
Year cannabis cocaine heroin others total Male female 
1990 170.6 110.6 861.25 NA 1,142.45 NA NA
1991 1,496.61 545.39 66.82 15.72 2,124.54 NA NA
1992 2,508.11 415.67 690.84 3.51 3,618.13 NA NA
1993 7,378.89 1,293.69 283.51 1.87 8,957.96 NA NA
1994 19,732.66 90.76 91.65 94.3 20,009.37 632 61
1995 15,258.74 15.91 30.27 210.39 15,515.31 732 66
1996 18,604.72 6.16 19.38 1,203.79 19,834.05 1,099 88
1997 15,904.72 31.9 10.49 1,736.01 17683.12 2,208 164
1998 16,170.51 9.26 3.62 2,609.75 18,793.14 2,610 204
1999 17,691.14 15.64 81.35 322.25 18,110.38 2,380 121
2000 272,260.02 53.42 56.6 234.28 272,604.32 2,253 132
2001 317,950.20 195.82 46.63 308.84 318,501.49 2,693 136
2002 506,846.09 35.35 55.62 791 507,728.06 2,549 108
2003 535,593.75 134.74 87.58 937.41 536,753.48 2,316 174
2004 68,310.07 124.47 90.94 233.83 68,759.31 3,382 318
2005 125,989 395.91 70.42 88.72 126,543.65 3,181 292
2006 192,368.30 14,435.88 33.09 515.57 207,352.84 5,883 440
2007 210,262.90 393,678 120,638 699,735 211,476.00 5,891 417
2008 335,535.34 3,654,904 116,054 5,304,033 336,442.84 7,584 315
2009 NA NA NA NA NA 6,700 342
2010 174,661.59 706.433 202.08 2,550.622 178,120.725 6,296 492
2011 191,847.91 410.805 39.752 2,982.45   195,283.917 8,639 567
TOTAL 3, 027,851.50 19,781.24 2,954.83 16,071.17 3,085,355.15 47,028.00 4,437.00
Source: NDLEA 2012 Annual Report
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of several factors, and given that the fig-
ures continued to rise even in the face of 
the war on drugs suggested that the war 
had failed. 
the MoDuS oPerAnDi AnD fAceS 
of the WAr on DrugS in nigeriA
The responsibility of prosecuting the 
war on drugs in Nigeria rests with the 
Nigeria Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA). This war is relentlessly being 
fought in collaboration with the police, 
customs, immigration, army and of re-
cent, with Nigeria Security and Civil De-
fence Corps to stem the cultivation of the 
most commonly trafficked and used drug 
(sativa cannabis) in the country. On rou-
tine basis, the NDLEA, the Nigeria Police 
and Army acting on intelligence, carry out 
both aerial and ground patrols on sus-
pected cannabis farmlands in their bid to 
carry the war to the local farmers who are 
producing cannabis. In 2009 for instance, 
the Cable News Network (CNN) reported 
of the NDLEA patroling the southern for-
ests (especially part of Ondo and Delta 
states) in search for hidden cannabis 
farms for eradication. 
Eradication by the NDLEA and its part-
ners is carried out through clearing of 
farmland, usually by spraying of pesti-
cides. In the process, legal crops are also 
destroyed and innocent farmers and 
their family members assaulted and ar-
rested. Experts working for UNDCP Drug 
Policy Around the World Reports (2008b) 
believe that crop eradication is a failure 
because of what they regard as “balloon 
effect”, which means relocating the farm 
to another area. Various media and intel-
ligence reports reveal that marijuana cul-
tivation is shifting away from the arable 
lands of Ondo and Delta states of the 
southern part of the country to other 
states in the Northern part of the country 
as the raid intensifies in these traditional 
homes of marijuana. 
The NDLEA is also seriously prosecuting 
the war by means of interdiction which 
they engage to seize drugs en route to and 
from Nigeria. The agency is not alone in 
the prosecution of this war in this manner. 
Hundreds of trained NDLEA personnel are 
posted to the country’s borders to fore-
stall the clandestine smuggling of illicit 
drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and syn-
thetic drugs. Although some robust break-
throughs have been made in this regard, 
interdiction is acknowledged as having 
fallen short of its avowed objective of cur-
tailing the country’s drug availability and 
use (UNDCP reports, 2008; Reuter, 1997). 
A key feature of the NDLEA war on 
drugs in Nigeria is raid/bust. In raiding 
suspected drug sellers and users, NDLEA 
and the police often storm, in a com-
mando style, any identified or suspected 
drug den or transaction point to dislodge 
the selling and buying of these drugs and 
by so doing make dealing on drugs more 
risky. From the birth of the agency till to-
day, raids on suspected drug dealers and 
locations have remained an enduring 
strategy, often conducted at odd hours, 
with the raid team in combat readiness. 
These raid sometimes lead to loss of life—
both of the dealers/users and among per-
sonnel of law enforcement agencies (see 
also Goldstein, 1985).
the nAture of nigeriA illegAl 
Drug MArKet AnD lAW
Against the backdrop of the estab-
lished link between drug markets, crime 
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and violence, and the moral indignation 
directed at the use and sale of drugs, 
legal controls had a long time ago been 
instituted with widespread appeal. Past 
and present Nigerian authorities have to 
share in the belief that to eliminate the 
dangerous crimes caused by drugs, and 
promote moral uprightness in the society, 
it is desirable to target both those who 
distribute these drugs, and those who use 
them—both seen by moral entrepreneurs 
as ‘devil folks’ (see Cohen, 2002; Goode 
& Ben-Yehuda, 2009). The NDLEA (2009) 
Annual Report states as follows: 
Recognising the links between illicit 
traffic in drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances and other related organized 
criminal activities which undermine 
the legitimate economy and threaten 
the stability and security of the coun-
try, Nigeria has been in the forefront 
of global efforts at suppressing the 
drug menace in support of global 
peace and security (NDLEA, 2009).
The first official Drug Control Law in 
Nigeria was the Dangerous Drug Acts of 
1935 which was aimed at the prohibition 
of importation, exportation, transit, pro-
duction, sales, distribution of opium, coca 
leaves, Indian hemp, morphine or heroin 
or other dangerous drugs (see Olorunto-
ba, 2006). This was followed by the Indian 
Hemp Decree of 1966 which prescribed 
a stiff punishment of death penalty or 21 
years of imprisonment for the cultivation, 
10 years of imprisonment for exportation 
and for those found smoking it or in pos-
session of it (see Federal Military Gov-
ernment, 1966). Obot (2004) reported in 
his seminal assessment of Nigeria’s drug 
policy between 1994-2000 that the 1966 
Decree was amended in 1975, with less 
severe penalties. He noted for instance, 
that the death penalty was abrogated 
while punishment for smoking was re-
duced to six months or fine. 
Throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s when 
the military controlled the affairs of the 
country, there was what appeared to be 
an ambivalence and complacent attitude 
of the military to drug matter, either partly 
because the drug issue was not perceived 
as a public problem, or the international 
agencies and the western countries had 
not brought pressure to bear on the au-
thority whom they apparently tolerated. 
However, beginning from the mid-80s, 
the lukewarm attitude of the military to-
wards the problem of drugs changed as 
a result international pressures and pos-
sibly to deal with internal opposition that 
was on the rise. Consequently, the mili-
tary regime of this period came up with 
tougher and repressive laws and policies 
on illegal drug sale and use. Obot (2004) 
however explained that this attitude 
which occasioned the 1984 Nigerian drug 
law was done to reflect the mood of the 
new military officers in power. This mood 
appeared to be that of ‘corrective’, ‘intol-
erance, and a no-nonsense one’. 
Two significant changes occurred in the 
statute book of Nigeria drug policy and 
law during the 1980s and 1990s periods 
of military rule. One was the amendment 
and subsequent repea1ling of the already 
amended 1975 Indian hemp Act (decree) 
which brought back stiff penalties for traf-
ficking in and/or sale of cannabis. The 
second, and most pronounced, was the 
creation of a Special Tribunal (Miscella-
neous Offences). The Decree expressly 
prescribed death penalty by firing squad 
for dealing in, buying, selling, exposing 
or offering for sale or luring somebody to 
buy, sell, use, smoke, or inhale any drug 
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known as cocaine or related drugs (see 
Federal Military Government, 1984b). 
Worst still, the Decree had a retroactive 
effect—being backdated to 31 December 
1983 when the government came to pow-
er. The turning point of the Decree and 
historic in the annals of drug regulations 
in Nigeria was the execution (by firing 
squad) of three men who had been con-
victed of the offence prior to the promul-
gation of the Decree (see also Ellis, 2009). 
As a result of public outcry which greeted 
the execution—by both local and inter-
national community—there was a mora-
torium on the punishment. On 27 August 
1985, the Decree was repealed when a 
new military government came to power. 
In 1989, the National Drug Law En-
forcement Agency (NDLEA) was founded 
by Decree 48. The Decree created an 
enforcement agency and institutional 
framework charged with the responsibil-
ity of regulating what was perceived to 
be an ever-increasing trafficking in and 
abuse of illegal drugs. The Decree speci-
fied punishments for illicit drug use and 
trafficking, that included life imprison-
ment for trafficking in cocaine, LSD, her-
oin or similar drugs, asset, and 15 years 
but not exceeding 25 years for possession 
or use (for details, see NDLEA Annual re-
ports, 2009; Uwiagbo in http://againstba-
bangida.com/docs/gloriaokon.pdf). 
The war on drugs took a dramatic turn 
in 1993 with the ascension to power of 
a new military administration as a result 
of an unpopular coup d’etat. Possibly to 
earn some level of credibility, having been 
made a pariah by the international com-
munity, the administration chose to focus 
on the drug issue. Decree 48 was amend-
ed in 1995, providing the NDLEA with 
more power to enforce drug laws. For 
instance, the Money Laundering Decree 
of 1995 conferred greater power on the 
agency to mount clandestine surveillance 
on the bank accounts of suspected traf-
fickers. The same Money Laundering De-
cree placed a ceiling on cash payment and 
mandated banks to report deposits be-
yond the limit set; it also empowered the 
NDLEA to eavesdrop on any suspected 
person’s telephone line. Expectedly there 
was a barrage of criticisms that trailed 
these decrees and their contents by indi-
vidual Nigerians and foreigners, especially 
civil society groups. 
In 2004 Decree 48 was further ammend-
ed by the Cap N30 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria (LFN 2004). The Act stipulates 
among other things, life imprisonment 
for production, import, export, sales, pur-
chase, and possession of drugs such as 
cocaine, LSD, heroin or any other similar 
drugs upon conviction. There was also a 
provision for imprisonment of between 
7 and 25 years for various categories of 
offences such as letting out one’s prem-
ises for use in drug transaction, smoking 
or using illicit drugs, impersonating any 
staff of the agency, aiding and abetting in 
the commission of the offence, etc. (for 
details see NDLEA Annual Report, 2009, 
pp. 78-85). This amendment was with-
out prejudice to some of the provisions 
of the 1995 amendment which included 
the Money Laundering and Forfeiture of 
assets decrees. 
Table 2 shows the details of cases so 
far prosecuted, won and/or lost by the 
NDLEA since it started operation in 1990 
to 2011. What is clear from the table and 
relevant to our central argument is the 
fact that cases handled by the Agency 
continue to increase each year, suggest-
ing that drug trafficking and abuse have 
continued to rise despite the sustained 
war on the commodity. Alternatively, it 
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also goes to suggest that NDLEA was be-
coming either more efficient (see Obot, 
2004), or that offenders were becoming 
more stupid and careless. 
Of importance too, in the context of 
the main discourse of this paper, is that 
the war on drugs is being fought in all 
fronts. Not only is the war being waged in 
the field, but it is also being carried to its 
logical conclusion in this important phase 
of criminal justice system—the judiciary/
court. The stabilising of arrest rates be-
tween the years 2001-2005 is instructive. 
2001-2005 may be described as Nigeria’s 
‘stable political era’ in the new democrat-
ic Nigeria; an economic and political peri-
od that appeared to be less favourable to 
illegal drug trafficking. Ryan (1997), Otu 
(2004), Williams (1997), Gastrow (1998) 
have all suggested that illegal organised 
criminal activities tend to peak during pe-
riods of relative political instability. 
AnAlYSiS AnD DiScuSSion 
of the WAr on DrugS
As a crime control policy, the hawks’ 
(punitive) view surely has certain coher-
ence, common sense, and a widespread 
appeal. Given the plausible nexus be-
tween drugs and crime, the war on drugs 
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table 2. Prosecution of drug offenders by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA) between 1990 –2011
Year cases Won lost
1990 16 13 3
1991 78 42 36
1992 271 165 106
1993 154 125 29
1994 87 67 20
1995 343 333 10
1996 550 537 13
1997 1,104 1,088 16
1998 1,194 1,180 14
1999 1,474 1,545 20
2000 1,626 1,624 2
2001 1,172 1,172 0
2002 870 870 0
2003 817 817 0
2004 853 853 0
2005 779 779 0
2006 1,363 1,363 0
2007 1,508 1,459 49
2008 1,720 1,712 8
2009 1,506 1,497 9
2010 1,526 1,509 17
2011 1,501 1,491 10
Total 20,512 20,151 362
Source: NDLEA 2011 Annual Report
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may have curtailed the spread of these 
crimes. Drugs modify consciousness and 
give the user either a sense of confidence 
that leads to misjudgement or make the 
user placid. So one major benefit coming 
out of the current antidrug policy in Nige-
ria is that it surely sends the message that 
drugs are not tolerated making both sell-
ers and users to act with caution. 
Rational choice or economic theory 
suggests that toughness and punitiveness 
should scare away potential traffickers 
and users, raise the price of drugs, make 
them less accessible, and even reinforce 
the message that drugs are harmful and 
not tolerated in the society. This should 
perhaps lead to less drug sale-and/or use 
that would eventuate into fewer-drug-
related problems. Paradoxically, however, 
empirically-based evidence suggests that 
notwithstanding sharply increased peri-
ods of stringency, occasioned by all-out-
war, prices of drugs in Nigeria have been 
declining. At the same time, drug use and 
sales are increasing, particularly among 
young Nigerians, so that the forbidden 
fruits effects1 of these drugs are taking a 
toll on Nigerian youth (see also NDLEA, 
1995; Odejide, 1988; Obot, 1993b; Iban-
ga, 1997; Obot et al., 2001). These issues 
constitute a major analytic and policy 
puzzle to a number of drug policy stake-
holders in Nigeria. 
The war on drugs in Nigeria is replete 
with contradictions, making it not differ-
ent from other countries seeking to con-
trol illicit drugs through brute force and 
rule of law. It comes with lots of costs par-
ticularly the human costs that fall on every 
person connected to the illicit economy. 
Reuter (1997) explained that America’s 
drug policies, as currently being favoured, 
are punitive (in both rhetoric and real-
ity), divisive (certainly by race/ethnicity, 
age and class), intrusive (in small ways for 
many and in large ways for some groups) 
and expensive (costing hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars annually). The same policy 
scenario applies to Nigeria which whole-
heartedly toes the path of the former’s 
drug policies (see also NDLEA Reports, 
2008, 2009). 
Currently, in Nigeria, there are serious 
security challenges facing the country. 
Apart from conventional crimes such as 
armed robbery, rape, theft, and fraud, mi-
litia insurgents of different shades of opin-
ion and ethnic-religious backgrounds con-
tinue to threaten national, state and local 
authorities. The manner these groups 
operate especially the most dreaded of 
them—the Boko Haram insurgents—sug-
gests they might have a link with other 
highly organisd criminal groups such as il-
legal arms and drug dealers. Several stud-
ies have linked armed groups to organised 
and syndicate criminals dealing on illicit 
commodities which lead to the emer-
gence of the popular narco-terrorism. 
Arising from the current insecurity in Ni-
geria, economic development and growth 
are adversely affected as the much need-
ed foreign and local investors are wary to 
invest in the country for fear of either be-
ing kidnapped, robbed or killed. 
The war on drugs in Nigeria as cur-
rently being prosecuted is also discrimi-
nating. Its main targets are the poor and 
less privileged racial groups in societies al-
ready characterised by racial tension and 
highly polarized ethnic divisions. In the 
U.S. for instance, it is explained that the 
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poor and minorities, especially the Blacks 
and Hispanics, are the victims of this war 
(see Musto, 1973; Inciardi, 1986; Thio, 
1998). In South Africa, the majority of 
those arrested, or facing charges on drug 
offences are also mainly those at the bot-
tom ladder of the distribution chains, and 
are black or “coloured” (Otu, 2004). Many 
inmates are users or traffickers who are 
more or less privileged and expendable 
pawns in the game. In Nigeria, significant 
numbers of those arrested and prosecut-
ed for drug offences are people at the 
margin of society, trying to survive by of-
fering their services to the drug barons in 
a country where unemployment is quite 
alarming. The NDLEA 1992 Drug Data Col-
lection Unit reported that 85% of the 243 
drug traffickers arrested were unskilled 
workers with a substantial number of ar-
restees found to be impoverished and 
with low level of or no education at all. 
An interesting aspect of the war is 
its relationship to other crimes. Rather 
than the commodities causing numerous 
crimes, it is the war on drugs that is said 
to be causing the crime. This is the view 
shared by standard liberal critique (see 
Skolnick, 1992; Click 1995:378; Chilton, 
2001. These authors explain that one of 
the important consequences of the pu-
nitive approach to drugs has been the 
growth of crime, violence and disease 
on the parts of addicts and sellers. The 
reason is simple. Tighter restrictions of-
ten create black markets which depend 
on violence to enforce contacts, prevent 
employees, customers and others from 
providing information on the illegal activi-
ties to enforcement agencies (Goldstein, 
1985; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1996; Ryan, 
1997). Such activities also motivate cor-
ruption, exacerbating a situation in which 
Nigeria continues to score very high on 
the corruption index. Nigeria’s illicit drug 
market has not reached the point where 
drug money openly fuels instability and 
conflict as in Mexico and Colombia, and 
is unlike some Western consumer coun-
tries with streets that are blighted by war-
ring drug gangs, street violence and high 
volumes of property crime committed by 
low-income, dependent users. However, 
the current war on drugs may just be the 
driver leading to such a scenario. 
Nigerians are known for their honed-
business skills, and there is widespread 
youth restiveness and unemployment 
in the midst of the disrupting influences 
of the war on drugs. An over-reliance on 
criminal justice solutions may have been 
contributing to the widespread violence 
in the urban slums and city centres more 
than drug use. Rationale and economic 
theories teach us that whenever strin-
gent laws are imposed on any economic 
activity, the people will go underground 
which will result in high prices, and the 
consequent increase in the violent crimes 
committed by both the users and traf-
fickers. Moore (1983) and Goode (1984) 
explain that since current policy outlaws 
the manufacture, distribution, posses-
sion, and use of these drugs, they also 
create criminal offences where none pre-
viously existed. Antonio Maria Costa, the 
Executive Director, UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2008 while reflecting on the 
deleterious effect of the war on drugs ex-
plained thus: 
The control system and its applica-
tion have [created] a huge criminal 
black market ... There is no shortage 
of criminals competing to claw out a 
share of a market in which hundred 
fold increases in price from produc-




webpdf, p. 216). 
The social impact of the strict prohibi-
tion on these drugs includes the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. Because of the illegality which 
surrounds the use of these drugs, users 
often resort to secret, crude and unguard-
ed methods of use. In Africa and Nigeria, 
HIV/AIDS is a serious problem, with the 
estimated number of infected persons in 
Nigeria naively put at 1.5 million of the 
population. Obot (2000), Odejide (1989), 
observe that amongst the majority poor 
community, HIV virus is widespread, and 
is facilitated by unhygienic means of us-
ing drugs. To make matters worse, access 
to anti-retroviral drugs in Nigeria is very 
limited so that many Nigerians in the ille-
gal drug market continue to suffer double 
tragedies of being haunted by the en-
forcement agencies for their sale and use 
of drugs and are also being denied the 
right to quality health care. 
The cost of the war on illegal drugs 
also readily comes to mind and calls for 
scrutiny. The cost unarguably, eats deep 
into the treasury of Nigeria meagre re-
sources. Nigel Walker (cited in Whitaker 
1987) suggested that criminal law should 
be determined on the grounds of classi-
cal economic cost-benefit, not morality. 
The true gauge of the success of the war 
on drugs is thus better measured in the 
amount of financial assistance that each 
state devotes to the efforts. In 1989 UN 
with a total budget of $1.76 billion allo-
cated about $37 million towards the war 
against drugs. Currently, it is estimated 
that about $100 billion are spent globally 
on drug law enforcement (see Transform 
Drug Policy Foundation estimate, 2011). 
In Nigeria the amount of money spent on 
the war on drugs is hard to come by but 
certainly on the high side, and currently 
runs into billions of naira. Even as some 
analysts believe that every kobo spent on 
checking the traffickers and users is worth 
it, the impact of these billions of Naira 
on the socio-economic development of 
a country like Nigeria, which struggles to 
grapple with development and growth, 
is certainly enormous and cannot be ig-
nored. Put lucidly, the war is irrefutably 
expensive. It is a crusade that entails an 
elaborate and expensive institutional ap-
paratuses, as well as a long time frame. In 
Nigeria, the NDLEA is duplicated in all the 
36 states of the federation, including Abu-
ja, the Nation’s capital. Maintaining the 
staff and equipment in all this states is fi-
nancially burdensome. In the end, it is the 
Nigerian taxpayers who bear the financial 
brunt of a policy that is increasingly being 
jettisoned by practising nations and states 
across Europe, South America and some 
states in the U.S. 
Table 3 shows the budgetary allocation 
of the NDLEA for the year 2000 to 2007. 
What is clear from the table above is that 
the amount of money spent by the NDLEA, 
especially on personnel costs, continues to 
rise even as they are described as paltry. 
One frustrating area of the war which 
builds up the cost is in the criminal jus-
tice system (see for instance, Shaw, 1995; 
Schmalleger, 1996: 402; Meier and Geis, 
1997; Reid, 1997; Baynham, 1998; Siegel, 
1998; American Bar Association cf. Beirne 
and Messerschmidt, 2003). As an out-
growth of the war on drug, all phases of 
the criminal justice process are increasing-
ly “drug driven”. In Nigeria defence attor-
neys consider delay tactics to be a sound 
legal manoeuvre so that delay of justice is 
the rule rather than an exception. Increas-
ing court backlogs threaten the legal sys-
tem’s infrastructure and efficiency.
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Interdiction, access to suspect’s bank 
account, the seizure of assets and impris-
onment, the key approaches of this war, 
have created significant corrupting influ-
ences and pressures. Corruption affects 
the police, court officials, members of the 
military, customs agents, and employees 
of the correctional services. These people 
are often implicated in drug deals and this 
raises a number of ethical and moral ques-
tions about the war (see UNODC,2007). 
Who BenefitS froM the WAr?
The collateral damage of the war—dis-
crimination, crime and violence, economic 
cost, human rights violations, environmen-
tal pollution, development and security, 
public health, loss of sovereignty and a host 
of others—means that ultimately, the only 
benefit accruing from the war on drugs in 
Nigeria is that no one benefits; everyone 
in the war is a loser. War on drugs means 
the battle line is drawn so that each oppo-
nent holds to its fortress. If the experience 
of the U.S is anything to go by, then Nigeria 
and her people can begin to expect the in-
flux of vandals in the country who will be in 
a good position to take over the organised 




that the war on drugs in countries such as 
Mexico, Colombia and Afghanistan has led 
to the displacement of the trade in West 
Africa with Guinea Bissau already assum-
ing the status of a ‘narco-state’. 
Ultimately, the people who lose most 
in the war on drugs in Nigeria are the or-
dinary, poor, marginalized and vulnerable 
masses which the war ironically aims to 
protect. These people are predictably 
women, children, and the unemployed 
youths. And, whenever these categories of 
citizenries are at risk because of any policy, 
then it is society which loses completely. 
Since it does not seem that any single 
social problem has ever been completely 
solved by waging war on such a problem2, 
ultimately, there must be an alternative 
OTU
table 3. Summary of funding for the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA) in Naira (N), 2000-2007
YeAr PerSonnel coSt oVerheAD coSt cAPitAl eXPenDiture reMArKS
2000 737,625,208 110,246,000 37,803,333
2001 789,434,817 186,216,124 314,244,106 N250m was supplementary budget
2002 936,631,205 83,796,800 Nil
2003 935,000,000 66,520,699 Nil 
2004 1,316,467,750 140,000,000 200,000,000
2005 1,854,114,252 152,000,000 261,660,000
2006 1,876,086,024 110,246,000 109,500,000 Capital not implemented 
2007 3,372,769,820 93,204,909 330,059,136 Capital not implemented 
Source: NDLEA 2008 Annual Report
2 Sociologists-cum-criminologists are shifting from an overarching age-long monolithic approach to so-
cial problems and crimes generally. Emphasis now is on integrating solutions in a multiplicity approach 
to dealing with these problems. 
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to war, or perhaps, making the war smart-
er—prohibition with less criminalization. 
Whenever a war is waged, both sides in 
the war are losers in all respects—physi-
cal and psychological. Given the fragile 
and weak nature of the Nigerian state 
and democracy, the war on drugs if not 
made smarter, may just exacerbate insta-
bility and undermine the nascent democ-
racy. The profitability of drugs, and the 
euphoria it gives users, mean that both 
the dealers and users will stop at noth-
ing to protect their business and ensure 
steady supplies. Any policy which focuses 
on drugs as a social criminogenic rather 
than a a health issue or aims at eradicat-
ing drugs will prove ineffective. 
The tragedy of the Nigerian war on 
drugs is its deliberate refusal to learn 
from other countries which though have 
waged this war for decades, suddenly re-
alized their mistakes and some are retrac-
ing their steps and retooling their strat-
egy. In these countries, there is a parallel 
understanding that the war on drugs, like 
the earlier attempt to prohibit alcohol, is 
a failure.
Notwithstanding the preceding discus-
sion of the war on drugs in Nigeria sug-
gesting that it is not achieving its desired 
goal, it is clear that there is something to 
cheer about the war. The war is viewed 
by many as compelling and necessary 
with a remarkable proportion of illicit 
drugs, traffickers, and users having been 
kept out of circulation in Nigeria. Moving 
around the cities, towns and villages by 
police and NDLEA officials reveals some 
level of circumspect behaviour among 
users and dealers that imply a measure 
of social control. This may be a major ac-
complishment of the enforcement, con-
sistent with Kleiman’s (1992) explanation 
that open air drug markets provide easy 
access to users moving from experimen-
tation to regular consumption, while also 
breeding violence and disorder. 
WhAt AlternAtiVe Drug PolicY 
oPtion iS AVAilABle to nigeriA?
Calls for a paradigm shift towards drug 
tolerance, with an emphasis on demand 
reduction, humanising drug laws and 
treatment policy, are rising (see Moore, 
1983; Crook, 2009; Nadelmann, 1998; 
Chilton, 2001; Reuter, 1997, Global Com-
mission on Drugs, 2011; Otu, 2011). The 
Global Commission on Drugs [GCM] 
(2011) has called for an end to criminali-
sation, stigmatisation and marginalisation 
of those who use drugs but who do no 
harms to others. It went further to ex-
plain that law enforcement efforts should 
focus not on reducing drug markets per 
se but on reducing their harms to indi-
viduals, communities and national secu-
rity (GCD, 2011). Some western countries, 
Latin American nations and states in the 
U.S have begun to align themselves to the 
new paradigm shift. In these countries, 
there is an increasing departure from the 
overemphasis on law enforcement and 
interdiction, towards harm reduction. The 
idea behind this shift is that reducing con-
sumption would help to stem profit, and 
therefore, the production of these drugs. 
In Nigeria, the harm reduction approach 
to drug problem presents an alternative 
drug policy to the current sustained but 
unwinnable war on drugs. As with other 
countries that have shifted approach, 
Nigerian drug policy should be based on 
pragmatism and not on war rhetoric, on 
realism and not moralism, and on the 
social context of the country and not on 
U.S. and western countries (for similar 
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remark see Nadelmann, 1998). The bad 
news for Nigeria tinkering with this policy 
is that drug demand and harm reduction 
policy works effectively where and when 
there is a clear, well-articulated and sin-
cere programmes in place to support the 
policy which unfortunately are seriously 
lacking in Nigeria. The good news, how-
ever, is that while it can be said that Nige-
ria is witnessing a hiatus of drug problem, 
this problem has not exploded to what 
we now have in most western countries, 
U.S., Asia, and South American countries. 
So the demand reduction policy may be 
less cumbersome and expensive to op-
erate. And because Nigerians are still 
imbued with strong cultural ties, with a 
strong sense of brotherhood, communal 
response to a common problem, and well 
developed non-state institutions of social 
control, the implementation of demand 
and harm reduction policy may be made 
a lot easier. 
concluSionS
Clearly, the war on drugs has curtailed 
the availability of drugs but only mod-
estly. Cnsidering that there are vulnerable 
classes of people—an army of youths who 
are unemployed and who will continue to 
find reasons to trade and consume these 
drugs, and women who are continuously 
driven by desperation—it appears reason-
able to predict that the war will only con-
tinue to worsen the problems associated 
with these drugs. Whitaker (1987) while 
reviewing the global drug situation and 
the apparent drug war failure explained 
that no government can ever conceivably 
convince all segments of the general pub-
lic to either abstain from illegal trading 
in these drugs, or from drug use, so that 
ultimately, the cost, both human and ma-
terial of continuing the war, will continue 
to mount. 
This paper is not about giving Nigerian 
drug policy makers suggestions on water 
tight alternative to the war on drugs; it is 
about analysing the array of critical issues 
and implications of Nigeria’s war on drugs 
and calling for a rethink by drug policy 
makers. Noting that the pros and cons of 
this war are multiple, the current paper 
suggests a need for a nuanced debate on 
the war and the need for experimentation 
with other drug policy alternatives. 
Albeit, doing less rarely attracts sup-
port for dealing with a problem per-
ceived to be widespread and daunting 
such as drug problems. This accounts for 
the wide spread supports for the extant 
war on drugs policy in Nigeria. However, 
as it is now, doing less of the prohibi-
tion may be the only responsible policy 
which Nigerian drug policy makers can 
undertake. This is all about smarter pro-
hibition that combines law enforcement 
with drug demand reduction. A smarter 
drug control policy in Nigeria should be-
gin to see the drug problem both as a 
social and health issue with programmes 
which will be user-friendly put in place 
to address the social and psychological 
and health issues that arise from the 
use of these drugs. On the supply side, 
a smarter drug policy in Nigerian should 
be the one that prohibits by locking up 
drug offenders for shorter terms, less 
incarceration, less policing, less surveil-
lance, fewer laws governing individual 
behaviours, and less obsessive discus-
sion of every lurid drug use and trade. 
This would mean less intrusive, divisive, 
and expensive policies and perhaps little 
increase in drug problems (see Reuter, 
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